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EQUAL PROTECTION OR EQUAL DENIAL? IS IT
TIME FOR RACIAL MINORITIES, THE POOR,
WOMEN, AND OTHER OPPRESSED PEOPLE TO
REGROUP?
by Inez Smith Reid*
Footnotes usually are passed over quickly by those bent on
hurrying to the "meat" and substance of an idea. Sometimes they
even rest dormant for years until someone imagines they have
great import in a struggle for survival, or for victory.
For Blacks, Justice Stone's 1938 footnote 4 in United States
v. Carolene Products Company, in which he called for a "more
searching judicial inquiry" when prejudice is exercised against
"discrete and insular minorities," ' supposedly proved a saving
grace as they approached the judicial arena in an intense effort
to shed the dregs of misery heaped on them by virtue of society's
callous historical reaction to black pigmented skins. Now, in the
decade of the seventies, women and others are attempting to
squeeze into the CaroleneProductsfootnote box while Blacks and
other racial minorities struggle to retain their position therein.
If the box is stretched to hold women, the poor, the mentally
ill, the imprisoned, the elderly, and even others, will the law of
equal protection lose its ordered character, assuming such a character can be detected? Moreover, will the gains that the oppressed can eke out from the judicial system be minimized by
affirming the elasticity of the suspect classification box?
Women, racial minorities, the poor, and other oppressed peoples might well ponder the value of alternative litigation strategies which highlight either a "fundamental personal rights and
interests" approach to equal protection questions, or one which
combines the suspect classification-fundamental personal rights
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Barnard College of Columbia University.
B.A. Tufts University, 1959; LL.B. Yale University, 1962; M.A. University of California
at Los Angeles, 1963; Ph.D. Columbia University, 1968.
1. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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and interests doctrines along the lines suggested by the "sliding
scale" model. 2 These alternative strategies might save years of
wasted effort since the Supreme Court seems destined to retain
the narrow limits of the suspect classification box. Rather than
women and the poor struggling alone year after year to assert
themselves separately and neatly into the suspect classification
box, their desired gains might be more numerous if they joined
forces with racial minorities and other oppressed peoples to shape
equal protection litigation into a more potent mold, emphasizing
not only the oppressed status involved, but also the fundamental
personal right or interest being effectively denied. Admittedly,
there is no guarantee that a combined approach would diminish
the emanation of decisions deemed inimicable to the interests of
the poor, minorities, women, and other oppressed peoples. But at
least it might avoid a vicious clash of competing interests, and
spare us years of virtually meaningless doctrinal decisions. Indeed, the Carolene Products footnote may represent a trap after
all - not a saving grace. At any rate, its singular importance may
have been exaggerated in recent years.
The suspect classification approach as it pertains to women,
racial minorities, and the poor will be analyzed first in order to
determine what gains, if any, have been achieved and lost via this
route. Then the utility of an equal protection-fundamental rights
approach which may accent more concerns common to women,
minorities, the poor, and other oppressed peoples will be examined. Finally, the value of a "sliding-scale" route to equal protection issues as a route which might permit the oppressed to present
a more reasoned equal protection package to the Court, and simultaneously make it more uncomfortable for the Supreme Court
to disregard the societal injustices heaped upon the poor, racial
minorities, and other oppressed peoples, will be considered.
THE SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION

Box

In defining those who should receive special protection from
the judiciary, Justice Stone wrote: "[p]rejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." '3 Under
2. For a description of the "sliding scale" model, see notes 177-80 infra and accompanying text.
3. 304 U.S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938).
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equal protection theory these "discrete and insular minorities"
generally fall into a "suspect classification" requiring close, rigid,
or strict judicial scrutiny with a "heavy" or "far heavier" burden
being imposed upon the state to justify the classification.4
Thus far, the Court clearly has recognized race,5 nationality,6
and alienage7 as suspect classifications. It has considered, but not8
yet categorically approved that status by majority vote, for sex,
poverty (wealth)9 and illegitimacy." Even mental illness has been
proposed for inclusion in the suspect classification box." If mental illness is accepted, why not physical disability, age, imprisonment, and a host of others? It may be true, as at least one commentator suggests, that the suspect classification notion leaves
much to be desired in the sense of "consistently applicable standards for choosing which minority groups to protect.""
We explore now the court-declared status of women, the
poor, and racial minorities with respect to the suspect classification box.
Are Women A Discrete and Insular Minority?
If Blacks constitute a discrete and insular minority, some
insist, women, too, fall into that status. If suspect classification
4. A traditional equal protection analysis looks first for the purpose of a legislative
classification, and second seeks to determine whether all those similarly situated are
covered by the classification. Its overall approach is to determine whether there is some
rationality in the statute in question. See Developments in the Law - EqualProtection,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969). On the other hand, once the Court concludes that a statutory
provision embodies a "suspect classification," or takes away a "fundamental interest"
from certain persons, the equal protection clause requires more than a rational inquiry.
Instead, the command is that the statutory provision be subjected to "strict judicial
scrutiny." Once "strict judicial scrutiny" is employed, the statute can be saved only if a
compelling state interest is found. Id. See also Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971
Term Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a
Newer Equal Protection,86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972); Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal
Protectionof the Laws, 37 CAni. L. Rgv. 341 (1949); Note, Legislative Purpose,Rationality, and Equal Protection,82 YAmrL. J. 123 (1972).
5. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
6. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944).
7. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944).
8. See discussion at note 14 et seq. and accompanying text infra.
9. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966); Also see discussion at note 75 et seq. and accompanying text infra.
10. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam).
11. Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?,83 YALE L. J. 1237 (1974).
12. Note, FundamentalPersonalRights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40
U. Cm. L. REV.807, 813 (1973).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1975

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 1

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 3, 1975]

is conferred on racial minorities because race is of a "congenital"
and "unalterable" character, 3 sex, also representing a biological
constant, merits such classification." If Blacks can dredge up
historical mind-sets and judicial decisions confirming their supposed inferiority, so too can women. Blacks may have been regarded as so much chattel, property, and a mass of inferiority
even before Dred Scott v. Sanford5 stamped the "badge of opprobrium" squarely on black shoulders. 6 Yet, women were
viewed as weak, delicate creatures destined to take orders from
superior men and tend the home fires - even before the judicial
insult implicit in Bradwell v. Illinois.'7
13. Note, Developments in the Law - Equal Protection,82 HAav. L. REV. 1065, 1126.
27; See also Note, Sex Discriminationand Equal Protection:Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment?, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1499 (1971).
14. Needless to say, the argument overlooks those few cases where a man or woman
has undergone surgery for the purpose of changing his or her sex.
15. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
16. See generally BLACK HISTORY: A REA P ' ISAL, (M. Drimmer ed. 1968); J. COMER,
BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE (1972); W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK - AMERICAN ATTrTUDS
TOWARD THE NEGRO 1550-1812 (1968); RACISM AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY, DOCUMENTARY
PERSPECrrS 1870-1910, (DeNevi. & Holmes eds. 1973); S. YETrTE, THE CHOICE: THE ISSUE
OF BLACK SuRvIVAL IN AMERICA (1971); Harris, Myths and Sterotypes RegardingAfrica and
Africans, in I. REm, THE BLACK PRISM: PERSPECTIVES ON THE BLACK EXPERIENCE (1970) at
31-36.
17. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). Bradwell permitted females to be excluded from
the legal profession. Women are fond of citing Justice Bradley's concurrence in Bradwell
as a prime example of disgraceful attitudes toward the female gender. Justice Bradley
remarked:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization,
which is founded in the devine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things,
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood.
Id. at 141. Women also have a tendency to lean on Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948)
as being indicative of women's early struggle for job equality. There the Supreme Court
upheld a Michigan law which prohibited women, as a general rule, from obtaining bartending licenses. The rationale was the need to avoid social and moral problems which
might arise from permitting women to tend bars. For other examples of historical discrimination against women see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 n.13 (1973); Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). See Equal Rights For
Women: A Symposium on the ProposedConstitutionalAmendment, 6 HARv. Civ. RIGHTSCiV. LE. L. REV. 215 (1971); Note, Sex Discriminationand Equal Protection:Do We Need
a ConstitutionalAmendment?, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1499 (1971).
See also THE PESmENT'S TASK FORCE ON WOMEN's RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, REPoRT: A MATrER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE (1970); PREsIDENT's COMMISSION ON STATUS OF WOMEN,
AMERICAN WOMEN (1963); L. KANowrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1969); J. MITCHELL,
WOMAN's ESTATE (1971); MS. READER (1973); RADICAL FEMINISM, (E. Levine & A. Rapone
eds. 1971); REBITH OF FEMINISM, (J. Hole & E. Levine eds. 1971); SISTERHOOD ISPOWERFUL,

(R. Morgan ed. 1970); WOMAN IN SEXIST SOCIETY-STUDmES INPOWER AND POWERLESSNESS,
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How far can one push the analogy between sex and race?'" Is
it possible to demonstrate that women have achieved more success in the legislative arena than racial minorities-especially
given the pending Equal Rights Amendment,"9 Title IX of the
Education Act Amendments of 1972,20 the Equal Pay Act,2 ' and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?22 Are women rapidly
becoming the new minority? Maybe a comparison of legislative
gains of women and racial minorities is unfair, or at least detrimental to notions of fair play for all. But the Carolene Products
footnote may compel that type of comparison.
In a thoughtful analysis of Roe v. Wade, 23 John Hart Ely

confesses:

24

I'm not sure I'd know a discrete and insular minority if I saw
one, but confronted with a multiple choice question requiring
me to designate (a) women or (b) fetuses as one, I'd expect no
credit for the former answer.
The easy choice for advocates of women's
rights would be (a) men
25
and (b) women for as Ely tells us,
[c]ompared with men, women may constitute [a discrete and
(V. Gornick & B. Moran eds. 1971); Symposium-Women and the Law, 5 VAL. L. REv.
203-488 (1971).
18. One author points to an almost perfect fit:

Both classifications create large, natural classes, membership in which is beyond the individual's control; both are highly visible characteristics on which
legislators have found it easy to draw gross, sterotypical distinctions. Historically, the legal position of black slaves was justified by analogy to the legal
status of women. Both slaves and wives were once subject to the allencompassing paternalistic power of the male head of house.
Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1499, 1507 (1971). A plurality of the Court in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), also noted the resemblance between race and sex discrimination in America. Id. at 684-88.
19. The proposed amendment reads in pertinent part: "Equality of Rights under the
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex." S. J. Res. 61, 91st Cong., 1st Seass. § 1 (1969). It has not yet been ratified by a
sufficent number of states.
20. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)-(c) (Supp. II, 1972).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (1970).
22. 42 U.S.C. §8 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1970). One commentator has suggested that"
when Congress acted to remedy some of the discrimination women suffered, it undermined
the argument that sex is a suspect classification." Tushnet, And Only Wealth Will Buy
You Justice - Some Notes on the Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 177, 181.
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (criminal abortion statute of Texas held unconstitutional as
violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
24. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920,
935 (1973). See also id. at 933-34 n.85.
25. Id. at 934-35.
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insular minority]; compared with the unborn, they do not.

Suppose the tables were switched leaving the multiple choice
between (a) women and (b) Blacks. Would one expect credit for
choosing women? Would Black women be considered women, or

Blacks? Or, would the stark clash of competing interests be sidestepped as unresolvable in academic credit terms?
The morass of the suspect classification box is becoming
clearer. It now behooves us to take a closer look at Supreme Court
"feminist-oriented" decisions to see exactly how the Court has
reacted to the female application for suspect status classification
as a "discrete and insular minority."
Griswold v. Connecticut,6 Eisenstadt v. Baird,2 and Roe v.
Wade, 21 though based mainly on privacy considerations, may
have paved the way for consideration of the female gender as a
suspect classification. The opportunity for an equal protectionsuspect classification analysis presented itself in Reed v. Reed.20
Chief Justice Burger resisted the "suspect classification" issue,
however, and resolved the case, instead, on supposedly traditional equal protection-rationality grounds." Confronted with an
Idaho statutory provision which preferred males over females as
administrators of intestate estates, 31 the Court sought to determine whether the sex-based classification was "reasonable, not
arbitrary" and whether it "[rested] upon some ground of differ26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Connecticut statute circumscribing the use of contraceptives
held unconstitutional on right of privacy grounds).
27. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Massachusetts statute which distinguished married from
unmarried persons for the purpose of regulating the distribution of contraceptives held
violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (Oregon statute proclaiming a mandatory preference for male
applicants over female applicants for the purpose of administering estates was held to be
violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
30. It has been argued that Reed cannot be understood or "explained on the basis of
the traditional rationality requirement." Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and
Equal Protection,82 YALE L. J. 123, 151 (1972). Rather, it must be viewed as employing
"a disguised balancing test." Id. As the proponents of this position maintain:
An alternative explanation of Reed is that the Court determined that the state's
interest in judicial efficiency was less important than the interest of women in
equal treatment with respect to the purpose of choosing qualified administrators
of decedents' estates . . . . The statute did not fall because it could not be
shown to be rationally related to a permissible purpose but because the Court
determined that the interest of women in equal opportunity outweighed a legitimate objective of the statute.
Id.
31. IDAHO CODE § 15-314 (1947). Part of the law, however, preferred women. In § 15312, for example, a woman whose husband had died intestate was preferred over a male
offspring, a male sibling, and a male parent.
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ence having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, .... ."32 The Idaho statutory provision violated the
equal protection clause, the Court declared, by arbitrarily
selecting males over females without a sufficient legislative purpose. 3
35
4
On the heels of Reed v. Reed came Frontierov. Richardson

which called into question provisions conferring benefits on
armed services dependents. Under the provisions, a male member
of the uniformed services could claim his wife as a dependent,
without undergoing any test of his wife's actual dependency,
whereas a female member of the same services could not claim
her husband as a dependent without submitting to an actual test
of dependency.36 Since the case involved a federal law, Sharon
Frontiero's equal protection claim was resolved under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. 37 The Court held that "by
according differential treatment to male and female members of
the uniformed services for the sole purpose of achieving administrative convenience, the challenged statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment insofar as they require a
female member to prove the dependency of her husband."3
Of great interest in Frontierois the fact that four members
of the Court, relying on Reed v. Reed, concluded that sex is a
suspect classification and that any sex-based classification "must
therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny." 39 Led by Justice
Brennan, Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall pressed the
point that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications
32. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).

33. The legislative purpose advanced was "avoiding intrafamily controversy" at hearings designed to determine qualifications of potential administrators. Id. at 76-77.
34. For other comments on Reed v. Reed see Ginsberg, Gender and the Constitution,
170 N.Y.L.J. 100, Nov. 26, 1973, at 1, col. 3.
35. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). For comments on Frontierosee Dorsen, The Court of Some
Resort, 1 Crv. Lim. REv. 82, 92 (Winter-Spring 1974); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw Equal Protection- Fifth Amendment, Due Process- Plurality of CourtDecides That SexBased ClassificationsAre Suspect, Frontierov. Richardson ... 5 RUTGERs-CANDN L.
J. 348 (1974).
36. 411 U.S. 677, 678 (1973).
37. Precedent for resolving an equal protection claim under the due process clause of
the fifth amendment may be found in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) and Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 n.5
(1973) citing Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964): "[wlhile the Fifth Amendment
contains no Equal Protection Clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable
as to be violative of due process.'
38. 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973).
39. Id. at 682.
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based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect . . .-.
Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Blackmun
protested4" that addition of the female gender to the suspect classification was premature since Reed v. Reed compelled the elimination of the statutory provisions in question anyway, and a resolution of the issue is in progress through the equal rights
42
amendment.
A curve or digression in its sex-based classification analysis
may have been evident in the Court's treatment of Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur13 Instead of resolving the issue of
the constitutionality of mandatory leaves of absence for pregnant
public school teachers beginning five months before the expected
childbirth in equal protection terms, a majority of the Court
chose the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as the
appropriate remedial mechanism, despite the fact that the Sixth
Circuit 4 and the United States District Court of the Eastern
4
District of Virginia45 (with approval from the Fourth Circuit)
rested their decisions firmly on the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Using as precedent Vlandis v. Kline47
and Stanley v. Illinois,"' the five man majority slipped into the
thicket of "irrebuttable presumptions" to invalidate rules of the
Cleveland and Chesterfield County School Boards. Wrote Justice
Stewart:4 9
neither the necessity for continuity of instruction nor the state
interest in keeping physically unfit teachers out of the classroom
can justify the sweeping mandatory leave regulations that the
Cleveland and Chesterfield County School Boards have
adopted. While the regulations no doubt represent a good-faith
attempt to achieve a laudable goal, they cannot pass muster
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
40. Id.
41. The three justices took issue with the plurality's interpretation of Reed. They
maintained that Reed "did not add sex to the narrowly limited group of classifications
which are inherently suspect." Id. at 692.
42. Id. at 691-92.
43. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). For comments on LaFleur see Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine:Equal Processor Due Protection?,72 MicH. L. REv. 800 (1974).
44. LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).
45. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D.Va. 1971).
46. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973).
47. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
48. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
49. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1974).
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because they employ irrebuttable presumptions that unduly
penalize a female teacher for deciding to bear a child.
The majority invoked Roe v. Wade,' 0 Griswold v.
Connecticut,5 and Eisenstadtv. Baird 2 at the outset, thus giving
the impression that the case might be handled along the same
lines as Reed v. Reed. Indeed, the majority then proceeded to
determine whether the cut-off dates in the regulations in question" bore some "rational relationship to the valid state interest
of preserving continuity of instruction,"54 thus seemingly plunging into a traditional equal protection-rationality analysis, but
nonetheless labeling it due process-rationality. No rational relationship to purpose was detected, in one instance, since the legislature might have chosen dates later in pregnancy as a cut-off
point and hence imposed "a far lesser burden on the women's
exercise of constitutionally protected freedom."' 5
Even though the five to six month cut-off dates might not
have been related rationally to a legislative purpose of "continuity of instruction," still they may have borne some relationship
to a second legislative objective-"keeping physically unfit
teachers out of the classroom." Although the majority admitted
that the rules clearly promoted the second legislative objective
they felt, nevertheless, than the controlling question remained
"whether the rules sweep too broadly."" This inquiry pushed the
Court into its irrebuttable presumptions web, and set the stage
for concluding that:-"
the provisions amount to a conclusive presumption that every
pregnant teacher who reaches the fifth or sixth month of pregnancy is physically incapable of continuing. There is not individualized determination by the teacher's doctor-or the school
board's-as to any parlicular teacher's ability to continue at her
job. The rules contain an irrebuttable presumption of physical
incompetency, and the presumption applies even when the
medical evidence as to an individual woman's physical status
might be wholly to the contrary.
50.
51.
52.
53.
notes 1
635 n.1,
54.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Provisions of the Cleveland and Chesterfield County rules are set forth in footand 5 of the Court's opinion. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,
637 n.5 (1974).
414 U.S. 632, 643 (1974).

55. Id.
56. Id. at 644.
57. Id.
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In the end both legislative objectives-"continuity of instruction" and "keeping physically unfit teachers out of the
classroom"-fell before the due process investigation; for
"[w]hile the regulations no doubt represent a laudable goad,
they cannot pass muster under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, because they employ irrebuttable presumptions that unduly penalize a female teacher for deciding to
bear a child."58
After having wrestled with the cut-off dates or "mandatory
termination" part of the regulations, the Court moved to those
rules concerning return to teaching duties following delivery of
the child." The same legislative purposes were advanced to justify the return regulations as for the pre-delivery termination of
work rules. While the Cleveland three-month rule was struck
down under the "irrebuttable presumptions" doctrine, the Chesterfield County regulation escaped the hatchet, for a woman
could return as soon as she submitted "a medical certificate from
her physician.""0 At any rate, she enjoyed the possibility of a
guaranteed return "no later than the beginning of the next school
year following the eligibility determination."'"
It remained for Justice Powell to suggest in a concurring
opinion that the case should be governed by the equal protection
clause, 'under the traditional rational basis inquiry. In his eyes, 2
[t]hese cases present precisely the kind of problem susceptible
to treatment by classification. Most school teachers are women,
a certain percentage of them are pregnant at any given time,
and pregnancy is a normal biological function possessing, in the
great majority of cases, a fairly well defined term. The constitutional difficulty is not that the boards attempted to deal with
this problem by classification. Rather, it is that the boards chose
irrational classifications.
But LaFleur proved to be a wasted effort in terms of a majority
decision on equal protection grounds.
After the majority of the Court chose not to embrace sex as
58. Id. at 648.
59. Under the Cleveland rule a woman could not return to her teaching duties before
"the beginning of the regular school semester which follows the child's age of three (3)
months." 414 U.S. 632, 635 n.1. The Chesterfield County rule, less rigid in nature, permitted a woman to regain her position upon submission of a "written notice from her physician that she is physically fit for full-time employment" and upon her "assurance that
care of the child will cause minimal interference with job responsibilities." Id. at 637 n.5.
60. Id. at 650.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 652-53.
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a suspect classification in Reed, Frontiero, or LaFleur, another
opportunity arose in Geduldig v. Aiello. 3 There the Court was
faced with a California unemployment compensation disability
insurance provision which disallowed disability benefits for normal pregnancy. Using a traditional equal protection-rationality
mode of analysis, Justice Steward, writing for a six man majority,
concluded that no invidious discrimination violative of the equal
protection clause could be found. Not only was the notion of sex
as a suspect classification again rejected by a majority of the
Court, but women's rights advocates also lost their battle to bring
normal childbirths under disability coverage. In accepting California's desire to keep employee contributions to the disability
insurance program at a minimum and to maintain the selfsupporting nature of the fund, the Court, with the realization that
California guaranteed adequate coverage for statutorily named
disabilities, announced that the state bore no obligation to include everyone under coverage at the same time." The Court may
have been comforted by the fact that at least some pregnant
women were covered due to the fact that abnormal pregnancies 5
fell within the scope of the disability insurance program.6 6
The important point to stress about Geduldig is that only
three members of the Court (Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall) adhered to the belief that "classifications based upon sex,
like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin,
are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny." 7 Justice White, part of the Frontieroplurality
94 S.Ct. 2485 (1974). See 3 HOFSTRA L. REv. 178 (1975).
U.S. -,
63. 64. The dissenters, Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall, rejected monetary considerations as a basis for upholding the California program under a suspect classificationstrict judicial scrutiny framework. "[W]hen a statutory classification is subject to strict
judicial scrutiny, the State 'must do more than show that denying [benefits to the excluded class] saves money.' Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, [415 U.S. 250, 263]
(1974). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-375 (1971)." - U.S. at.,
94 S.Ct. at 2496.
65. § 2626 of the CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE (West Supp. 1973) provides for payment of
benefits to claimants who are disabled "because of an abnormal and involuntary complication of pregnancy, including but not limited to: Puerperal infection, eclampsia, caesariam section delivery, ectopic pregnancy and toxemia." Id. at 2489 n.15.
66. A 1973 state court decision ruled that only those women undergoing normal
pregnancy would be excluded from benefits under the California plan. Abnormal pregnancies were held compensable. Rentzer v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals
Board, Human Relations Agency, 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336, (2d App. Dist.
1973). After Rentzer, the California Unemployment Insurance Code was revised to show
clearly that disability benefits could be paid in abnormal pregnancy cases. Geduldig v.
_ 94 S.Ct 2485, 2489 n.15 (1974).
U.S. Aiello, 94 S.Ct 2485, 2495 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
U.S. -, 67. Geduldig v. Aiello, -
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on the sex as a suspect classification issue, joined the majority in
Geduldig, and hence did not regard that case as sufficiently similar to Frontieroto dictate the elevation of women to the suspect
classification.
Neither under the rational basis nor the suspect
classification-strict judicial scrutiny orientation did Geduldig
yield a majority favorable to the interests of women's rights advocates. Thus, for many women, Geduldig clearly represents a setback in terms of efforts to get the Court to regard women as a
special class in need of careful judicial protection. 8
Prior to Geduldig, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve
another alleged sex discrimination case. Somewhat different from
previous sex discrimination cases was Kahn v. Shevin 9 involving
a inale appellant who sought to have a Florida statute ruled unconstitutional as contrary to notions of equal protection. The
statute conferred on widows an annual $500 property tax exemption but denied the same exemption to widowers." Obviously for
dissenting) citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). The three justices
continued:
[w]hen, as in this case, the State employs a legislative classification that distinguishes between beneficiaries solely by reference to gender-linked disability
risks, '[t]he Court is not . . . free to sustain the statute on the ground that it
ratiouially promotes legitimate governmental interests; rather such suspect classifications can be sustained only when the State bears the burden of demonstrating that the challenged legislation serves overriding or compelling interests
that cannot be achieved either by a more carefully tailored legislative classificaU.S.
tion or by the use of feasible less drastic means.' Kahn v. Shevin, -,
94 S.Ct. 1734, 1738 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
68. This trend is consistent with the position and prediction of at least one analysis
of the equal rights amendment. Professor Emerson and his co-authors wrote in 1971:
[a]n examination of the decisions of the Supreme Court demonstrates that
there is no present likelihood that the Court will apply the Equal Protection
Clause in a manner that will effectively guarantee equality of rights for women.
More important, equal protection doctrines, even in their most progressive form,
are ultimately inadequate for that task."
Brown, Emerson, Falk, and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basisfor EqualRights For Women, 80 YALE L. J. 871, 875 (1971). Furthermore, the authors
bluntly asserted:
[w]ithout a constitutional mandate, women's status will never be accorded the
special concern which race now receives because of the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
80 YALE L.J. 871, 885 (1971).
69.

-

U.S.

,

94 S.Ct. 1734 (1974).

70. FLA. STAT. § 196.191 (7) (1971) exempts from property taxation "[p]roperty to
the value of five hundred dollars to every widow, and to every person who is a bona fide
resident of the State, and has lost a limb or been disabled, in war or military hostilities
or by misfortune."
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Justice Douglas, one of those comprising the Frontieroplurality,
Kahn reflected a case not classifiable solely in terms of sex discrimination. Not only did it concern a male litigant, but it also
touched upon the law of taxation. As Justice Douglas phrased it: "7'
[t]his is not a case like Frontiero v. Richardson [citation omitted], where the Government denied its female employees both
substantive and procedural benefits granted males 'solely for
administrative convenience.' . . . We deal here with a state tax
law reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning
the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for whom that
loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden. We have long
held that '[w]here taxation is concerned and no specific federal
right, apart from equal protection, is imperilled, the States have
large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which
in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation.'...
A state tax law is not arbitrary although it 'discriminate[s] in
favor of a certain class . . .if the discrimination is founded
upon a reasonable distinction, or difference is state policy,' not
in conflict with the Federal Constitution. . . .This principle
has weathered nearly a century of Supreme Court adjudication,
[footnote omitted] and it applies here as well. The statute
before us is well within those limits.
In dissent Justice White made it clear that he has not abandoned the position of regarding sex as a suspect classificationat least in some types of cases. " . . . [G]ender-based classifications are suspect and require more justification than the State
has offered," he wrote; moreover, " . . . administrative efficiency
is not an adequate justification for discriminations based purely
on sex."7 2 Echoing Justice White were Justices Brennan and Marshall who consistently have reaffirmed their belief that sex is a
suspect classification.
Over the past few terms the Court obviously has toyed with
the concept of sex as a suspect classification. A majority almost
embraced the notion in Frontiero,but as succeeding cases clearly
demonstrate, enthusiasm waned quickly. Closer examination of
Geduldig and Kahn may suggest a valuable clue about the
Court's attitude toward the utilization of sex as a suspect classification. After Frontiero,the Court may have been more sensitized
to the economic issues which intruded into some of the sexlabeled cases. One might argue, validly, that where serious eco71. Kahn v. Shevin, - U.S. -,
72. Id. at _
, 94 S.Ct. at 1740.

_

94 S.Ct. 1734, 1737 (1974).
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nomic overtones penetrate cases imprinted with a "feminist"
label, the Supreme Court has shied away from positively employing the suspect classification doctrine for sex-related cases. In
Geduldig, for example, the Court reached a positive conclusion
with respect to abnormal pregnancies by ordering disability payments. For normal pregnancies, however, the Court majority
stepped away-refusing to rule such benefits applicable. For the
Court to have commanded payment of disability benefits for normal pregnancies would have meant an increased financial burden
on the state, or the employer, or the employee. Similarly, in Kahn
the state would have lost revenue had the property tax exemption
been extended to widowers.
Perhaps Justice White comes closest to seeing the economic
overtones of Kahn in asserting:73
I perceive no purpose served by the exemption other than
to alleviate current economic necessity, but the State extends
the exemption to widows who do not need the help and denies
it to widowers who do....
...[E]ven if past discrimination is considered to be the
criterion for current tax exemption, the State nevertheless ignores all those widowers who have felt the effects of economic
discrimination, whether as a member of a racial group or as one
of the many who cannot escape the cycle of poverty.
It may be, then, that the Court is particularly hesitant to
resort to the suspect classification for sex where economic considerations intrude. Hence, Frontiero may have been a false alarm
for those who deemed the Court ready to place the female gender
squarely into the suspect classification box regardless of the
"feminist" issue posed for resolution. And while that gender may
continue its effort to squeeze into that box, along with race, nationality, and alienage, the Court may be determined to make the
fit difficult. Hence, to the original inquiry, "are women a discrete
and insular minority?" one can only respond that the Supreme
Court does not think so-at least as of 1974. The harder question
is: will women continue to press the issue even if the returns seem
so negligible?
Are the Poor A Discrete and InsularMinority?
Like women, the poor have struggled to land in the suspect
classification box, but generally have had their efforts rejected
73. Id.
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rudely. In 1969 Professor Michelman called attention to the optimistic, egalitarian position of certain legal commentators:"
A notable feature in the Court's "egalitarian revolution,"
many commentators suggest, is the emergence of special judicial
hostility towards official discrimination, be it de jure or de facto,
according to pecuniary circumstance. . . If the commentators
are right, relative impecuniousness appears to be joining race
and national ancestry to compose a complex of traits which, if
detectible [sic] as a basis of officially sanctioned disadvantage,
render such disadvantage "invidious" or "suspect."
These commentators may have been encouraged by the Court's

decisions in Griffin v. Illinois 5 and Harper v. Virginia Board of

Elections,' 7 which seemed to suggest that " . . . classifications
based on the payment of a fee to the state are constitutionally
suspect because they adversely affect lower income groups.''7
But, we are reminded that Harper and Griffin "also involved
rights of fundamental importance, such as voting and criminal
procedure. Thus, a concern over distinctions based on wealth was
strongly reinforced by a desire to protect these important personal interests and it does not appear that distinctions based on
78
payment are always suspect. 1
5 and Williams v. Illinois," the
After Shapiro v. Thompson"
74. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protectingthe Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 19 (1969). See also Note,
DiscriminationsAgainst the Poor and the FourteenthAmendment, 81 HARv. L. REv. 435
(1967).
75. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Griffin held that Illinois' failure to provide a free transcript
to an indigent defendant in a criminil case where the state afforded appellate review as
of right was an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Justice Black wrote:
In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than
on account of religion, race, or color. Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance
bears no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could not
be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial.
Id. at 17-18.
76. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). In Harper the Court struck down Virginia's law requiring
potential voters to pay an annual poll tax. Justice Douglas asserted for the majority:
We conclude that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee
an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to
paying or not paying this or any other tax.
Id. at 666.
77. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1124
(1969).
78. Id.
79. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In Shapiro the Court invalidated statutes which conditioned
welfare benefits on length of stay or residence in a given locale, holding that such action
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Court quickly proved itself no friend of the poor." On the heels
of Dandridge v. Williams 2 came Wyman v. James.3 In quick
order these two decisions validated Maryland's welfare policy of
placing a maximum ceiling on welfare benefits despite the size of
the family, 4 and condoned New York's policy of administrative
visitations to determine whether welfare benefits should be continued. 5 Thus began a crystallization of setbacks for the poor.8"
It is true that the Court handed down what might be consid7 Bullock v.
ered pro-poor decisions in Boddie v. Connecticut,"
Carter," Lindsey v. Normet,89 U.S. Department of Agriculture v.
5 but none of those decisions
Moreno"° and Shea v. Vialpando,
infringed upon the constitutional right to travel interstate while failing to show a compelling governmental interest therefore. Id. at 634.
80. 399 U.S. 235 (1970). Using Griffin v. Illinois as precedent the Court held that:
[A]n indigent criminal defendant may not be imprisoned in default of payment
of a fine beyond the maximum authorized by the statute regulating the substantive offense.
Id. at 241.
81. After analysis of the Supreme Court's 1972 Term, Professor Tushnet contended
that "a majority of the Court was willing to invoke the equal protection clause to invalidate legislation that might harm its friends and neighbors but unwilling to strike down
legislation that harmed only the poor." Tushnet, And Only Wealth Will Buy You Justice
- Some Notes On the Supreme Court, 1972 Term., 1974 Wis. L. REv. 177, 180.
82. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Prior to Dandridge the Court had decided in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) that the due process clause required states to provide hearings
to welfare recipients prior to termination of benefits.
83. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
84. The Court in Dandridge utilized the traditional equal protection-rational basis
test, thus maintaining that:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
85. Wyman was decided under the fourth amendment. No violation of the right to
privacy was found by the Court majority, although the dissenters, Justices Douglas, Marshall and Brennan, took strong exception to the Court's analysis.
86. For further analysis of the status of the welfare poor see J. JOHNSON, PROTEST BY
THE POOR (1974); Dorsen, The Court of Some Resort, 1 Civ. Lm. REv. 82, 90-92 (WinterSpring 1974); Piven & Cloward, Eroding Welfare Rights, 1 Crv. Lm. Rv. 41 (WinterSpring 1974).
87. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
94 S.Ct. 1315
88. 405 U.S. 134 (1972). See also Lubin v. Panish, U.S. -,
(1974), wherein the Court struck down, at the request of an indigent candidate, California
election filing fee statutes (with fees ranging from $192-$982) on equal protection grounds.
89. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
90. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
U.S. -,
94 S.Ct. 1746 (1974).
91. -
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dealt with wealth or poverty as a suspect classification.12 Further92. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), involving the right of female welfare
recipients to file for divorce without paying requisite statutory fees, was resolved under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Viewing marriage as fundamental,
and recognizing that the courts were the only vehicle through which a divorce could be
granted, the Court considered the fees violative of fourteenth amendment due process. In
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the Court was confronted with statutory provisions
compelling political candidates to pay election filing fees as a condition for their candidacy. The fees ranged from $1000 to $8,900. The Court concluded that the filing fee
"system falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates, according to their
economic status." 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972). Since Bullock involved the election-voting
area, the Court followed Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), as
precedent and announced that "the laws [in question] must be 'closely scrutinized' and
found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives in order
to pass constitutional muster." Id. 'at 144. Thus, the fundamental interest approach,
rather than the suspect classification doctrine, brought Bullock under the rubric of "close
judicial scrutiny." The Court, too, was careful to delimit the boundaries of its opinion,
even under the "close judicial scrutiny" analysis:
[b]y requiring candidates to shoulder the costs of conducting primary elections
through filing fees and by providing no reasonable alternative means of access
to the ballot, the State of Texas has erected a system that utilizes the criterion
of ability to pay as a condition to being on the ballot, thus excluding some
candidates otherwise qualified and denying an undetermined number of voters
the opportunity to vote for candidates of their choice. These salient features of
the Texas system are critical to our determination of constitutional invalidity.
Id. at 149.
In Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), an Oregon statute which forced tenants to
post a double-bond to appeal from adverse decisions made under the Oregon FoRCMLE
ENTRY AND WRONGFUL DETAINER Acr (FED), ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 105.105-105.160 (1953),
was held unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. The Oregon Act required all persons appealing FED decisions to "file an undertaking, with one or more sureties, covering
'all damages, costs and disbursements which may be awarded against him on appeal.'"
405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). Losers in the lower court had to make an additional guarantee,
"with two sureties for the payment of twice the rental value of the premises 'from the
commencement of the action in which the judgment was rendered until final judgment
in the action.'" Id. at 76. The Court felt that "the discrimination against the poor, who
could pay their rent pending an appeal but cannot post the double bond, is particularly
obvious." Id. at 79. The Court then concluded: [t]he discrimination against the class of
FED appellants is arbitrary and irrational, and the double-bond requirement. . . violates
the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
The Court wasted little time in striking down § 3(e) of the FOOD STAMP Aar OF 1964
as amended, 84 Stat. 2048, 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970), which required all members of a
household to be related in order to receive food stamps. In U.S. Department of Agriculture
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (which did not concern payment of fees to obtain a right
of access to the political or judicial arena), the Court believed that the food stamp provision was aimed directly at hippies, whom the legislature did not wish to receive food
stamps. Applying a traditional equal protection-rational basis test, Justice Brennan maintained that the equal protection clause did not recognize "a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group" as a "legitimate governmental interest." Id. at 534.
Justice Brennan also asserted that "in practical effect, the challenged classification simply does not operate so as rationally to further the prevention of fraud." Id. at 537.
Decided on statutory rather than constitutional grounds was Shea v. Vialpando,
94 S.Ct. 1746 (1974). There the Court determined that a Colorado rule related
U.S. -,
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more, they did not have sufficient impact on the fundamental
conditions of the poor to counteract the devastating cumulative
4
effect of San Antonio v. Rodriguez,9" United States v. Kras,1
9
5
9
Ortwein v. Schwab, Fuller v. Oregon," Eisen v. Carlisle &
97 and
Jacquelin
Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co."
Rodriguez stands as the most bedeviling of the aforementioned decisions. In that case, the Court not only flatly denied
that eduction is a fundamental interest," but also claimed that
wealth could not be elevated to the suspect classification category
in the case because those alleged to be victims of the San Antonio
public school finance system could not be identified as a "definable category of 'poor' people." 0 "'[I]t is clearly incorrect . . .
to contend that the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts.' "101 Rodriguez
is so devastating to the interests of the poor because it levels two
crippling blows to the "poverty mid-section". One, asserting that
eduction, regarded most often as the mechanism for disentanglement from the web of poverty, is not a fundamental right; the
other rejecting the elevation of the poor to a suspect classification
entitling them to greater judicial protection.
Kras, Ortwein and Fuller all imposed burdens on the poor to
pay some statutory fees which conditioned the right of judicial
access. In all three cases the Court rejected equal protection argu,0 2
ments.
to AFDC (Aid to Families With Dependent Children) benefits was inconsistent with §
402(a)(7) of the SOCIAL SECUmTY Acr OF 1935, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (Supp,
II, 1972). The rule had placed a ceiling of $30 on the amount of work-related expenses
which a welfare recipient could collect.
93. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
94. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
95. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
96.

-

U.S.

-,

94 S.Ct. 2116 (1974).

97. U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2140 (1974). See 3 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 178 (1975).
98. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
99. 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
100. Id. at 25.
101. Id. at 23, quoting Note, A StatisticalAnalysis of the School FinanceDecisions:
On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, 1328-29 (1972).
For further analysis of questions raised by Rodriquez see Goldstein, Interdistrict
Inequalities in School Financing:A CriticalAnalysis of Serrano v. Priestand Its Progeny,
120 U. PA. L. REv. 504 (1972); Simon, The School FinanceDecisions: Collective Bargaining and Future FinanceSystems, 82 YALE L.J. 409 (1973); Note, supra, 81 YALE L.J. 1303
(1972).
102. At least one suggestion has been made that the first amendment may provide a
more suitable theoretical basis under which to decide cases involving indigents' right of
access. Note, A FirstAmendment Right of Access to the Courtsfor Indigents, 82 YALE L.
J. 1055 (1973).
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In Kras a $50 voluntary bankruptcy discharge filing fee was
held not to violate the equal protection clause despite Kras' contention that the fee arbitrarily discriminated against the poor.
Not only did the Court refuse to follow Boddie v. Connecticut on
the ground that, unlike marriage, bankruptcy is not a fundamental right, but Justice Blackmun, writing for the five member majority, clearly discarded the suspect classification category as an
appropriate avenue for reviewing wealth discrimination."' 3 While
the more affluent may regard $50 small and manageable even to
the poor, there is a level of poverty which makes acquisition of
even $50 extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible. Moreover,
the sum involved in Boddie totalled at least $60 and was viewed
as an impermissible burden on the welfare mother's access to
divorce decrees.
The Ortwein fee, $25 to question welfare agency rulings,
might be regarded as ludicrously small by some, but as painfully
hard to obtain by an elderly welfare recipient. Yet the Court ruled
that Kras, not Boddie, governed. Dismissing equal protection
contentions with short shrift, the Court's per curiam decision
read:,04
Appellants urge that the filing fee violates the Equal Protection Clause by unconstitutionally discriminating against the
poor. As in Kras, this litigation, which deals with welfare payments, is in the area of economics and social welfare.
The relegation of Ortwein to the "economics and social welfare"
area meant that "[n]o suspect classification, such as race, nationality, or alienage, is present," and further that "[tihe applicable standard is that of rational justification." ' 5 Oregon had duly
met its burden of showing some rational justification for the $25
filing fee: "The Oregon court system incurs operating costs, and
the fee produces some small revenue to assist in offsetting those
expenses."' 01
It may not be farfetched or unfair to mention an image which
immediately pops into mind after reading the majority opinion
in Ortwein: that of a stooped, poorly dressed, elderly welfare recipient next to a court system equipped with its comfortable
chairs for judges and other judicial finery. ' Whose operating
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
physical

United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973).
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Admittedly some state court systems leave much to be desired with respect to
surroundings.
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costs should be preferred if the image is accurate? Justice Douglas' assessment of the Court majority is succinct but telling: "The
majority today broadens and fortifies the private 'preserve for the
affluent.' The Court upholds a scheme of judicial review whereby
justice remains a luxury for the wealthy." '
Fullerv. Oregon was somewhat different factually from Kras
and Ortwein. There a convicted defendant deemed financially
capable of doing so was compelled to reimburse "expenses specially incurred by the state in prosecuting the defendant."'' 5 Probation was conditioned on repayment of the expenditures. In
applying a traditional equal protection-rational basis standard,
the Court found the Oregon scheme "wholly noninvidious" with
respect to the distinction between the convicted and nonconvicted. The Court further found no differential treatment between a civil debtor and a criminal debtor, although Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, registered a dissent on this
issue, believing instead that "[p]etitioner's failure to pay his
debt can result in his being sent to prison. In this respect the
indigent defendant . . . is treated quite differently from other
' 1
civil judgment debtors.
While Fuller on its face may not appear detrimental to the
interests of the poor, a more in-depth examination may demonstrate that one recently released from poverty may be dragged
back by the burden of being required to pay for help received
while indigent. Is it too much of an exaggeration, for example, to
expect states and the federal government, after Fuller, to try to
recoup not only the costs of criminal litigation or proceedings
against defendants, but also to seek the $7,000 to $12,000 which
a poor student may have received in state and federal scholarship
grants once a student completes his education and moves into the
job market? A graduate who accepts a relatively low-paying job
($5,000 to $10,000) in a field such as social welfare or community
development may find him or herself thrown back to the ranks
of the indigent by recoupment statutes. Similarly, a released
inmate just beginning to get back on his feet through a low level
108. 410 U.S. 656, 661-62 (1973).
109. U.S.
94 S.Ct. 2116, 2119 (1974) (citing ORE. Rav. STAT. §
161.665 (1973)).
110. Id. at-..-, 94 S.Ct. at 2123.
111. Id. at _
94 S.Ct. at 2128 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas concurred with the majority and thus divorced himself from the dissent of Justices Marshall
and Brennan. The basic reasons for the divorce appear grounded in procedural concerns
which precluded him from deciding the merits of the equal protection question.
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unskilled job, may feel utterly defeated as recoupment statutes
take away the little economic gain realized through employment.
The impact of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin"' and Zahn v.
International Paper Co.1 3 on the poor must be singled out for

mention, even though they do not fit neatly into a wealth/poverty
category. Consumer groups, and traditionally disadvantaged
groups like the poor and Blacks, have relied upon class actions
as a means of curbing widespread injustices.' In Eisen and Zahn
the Court watered down the class action mechanism by imposing
stringent procedural requirements on class action litigation. In
Zahn the Court held that both named and unnamed plaintiffs
must meet the requisite jurisdictional amounts in diversity cases.
And in Eisen the Court required that reasonable notice be mailed
to all reasonably identifiable class action plaintiffs, regardless of
the costs involved. In Eisen that would have meant $250,000
worth of mailing costs. Needless to say, the disadvantaged who
must make certain that each plaintiff has a claim in excess of
$10,000 in diversity actions, as well as bear the costs of notice
requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, can, in
effect, be shut out from the judicial process. If the property owners in Zahn and the purchasers of odd-lot stock in Eisen felt
pinched by the Court's rulings, racial and economic minorities
5
must have been crushed."
For the poor, then, Supreme Court decisions have not been
particularly rewarding in terms of chipping away at fundamental
injustices based on how much money one controls. Certainly poverty (wealth) has not been placed squarely alongside race as a
112. U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2140 (1974). See 3 HoFsTRA L. REv. 178 (1975).
113. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
114. For comments on class action litigation see, Note, Eisen HI: Fluid Recovery,
Constructive Notice and Payment of Notice Costs by Defendant in Class Action Rejected,
73 CoLwi. L. REv. 1641 (1973); Note, Managing the Large ClassAction: Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 87 HARv. L. REV. 426 (1973).

115. As Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, put it:
The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has against
those who command the status quo. I would strengthen his hand with the view
of creating a system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well as to those
liberally endowed with power and wealth.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, - U.S.
concurring, dissenting in part).

-

94 S.Ct. 2140, 2156-57 (1974) (Douglas, J.,

Bills have been introduced in Congress to counteract the effect of Eisen. H.R. 16153,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), H.R. 16153, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), sponsored by Con-

gressman Charles A. Vanik of Ohio, allows district courts to fashion orders deemed necessary to create manageable sub-classes. H.R. 16152, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), also

sponsored by Congressman Vanik, sanctions aggregation of plaintiffs amounts in controversy to ascertain if the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement has been met.
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suspect classification. This of course means that strong legislation which in fact heaps unwarranted burdens on the poor can be
stamped consistent with notions of equal protection and due process.
Will Blacks Continue to Be Regarded As A Discrete and Insular
Minority?
We have known since the days of Korematsu v. United
States ' that race is a suspect classification. As such, it requires
"a far heavier burden of justification, 11 7 and is valid only if required for some "overriding purpose." ' Occasionally, some have
argued that while governments must be neutral with reference to
race, some classifications based on race may be tolerable if they
in fact favor a disadvantaged minority."'
While racial minorities may seem constitutionally secure in
the suspect classification box, the Court often does not clearly
recognize the pernicious interplay of racial considerations in some
legislative and administrative rulings, nor in crucial state cases.
This is true particularly in three critical cases, decided contrary
to the interests of some Blacks: San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rogriguez,2 0 Milliken v. Bradley,' and DeFunis v.
2 - It is also
Odegaard.
true in other cases such as James v.
121
1
Valtierra, 23 Dandridge v. Williams, 2rPalmer v. Thompson,
2
and Mayor of Philadelphiav. EducationalEquity League. 1
Blacks have been damaged, perhaps permanently, by the
combined impact of Rodriguez, Milliken and DeFunis. At the
close of the 1972-73 Term the Supreme Court left many pressing
educational problems unresolved. Perhaps the Justices felt that
116. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
117. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964).
118. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
119. See Freund, ConstitutionalDilemmas, 45 B.U.L. REv. 13 (1965); Kaplan, Equal
Justice in an Unequal World: Equalityfor the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment,
61 Nw.U.L. REV. 363 (1966); Kurland, Egalitarianismand the Warren Court, 68 MicH. L.
Rv. 629 (1970). The same kind of favoritism argument has been advanced as a means of
eliminating sex discrimination. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The EqualRights
Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasis for EqualRights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
It is interesting to note, though, that the authors believe that the equal rights amendment
will not permit such beneficial use of sex as a classification. Id. at 904.
120. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
121. U.S. _
94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974).
122. U.S. 94 S.Ct. 1704 (1974).
123. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
124. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
125. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
126. U.S. -,
94 S.Ct. 1323 (1974).
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the full impact of Rodriguez should be allowed to explode and
filter throughout the society before other equally controversial
decisions were released. Hence the decision to affirm Bradley v.
School Board of City of Richmond127 without comment on the

issue of desegregation (which gave rise to the original controversy)
might have been an intentional effort to avoid too many fireworks
in one term. The flame of school consolidation was approached
and extinguished in the 1973-74 Term by way of Milliken v.
Bradley.28 If there were any doubt about the demise of Brown v.
Board of Education29 after Rodriguez, it quickly dissipated with
Milliken. Milliken might best be described as a cold, insensitive,
stilted opinion mirroring absolutely no feel or appreciation for the
plight of the urban ghetto segregated school pupil hungering for
the kind of education which can open new vistas for him or herbut knowing full well that those vistas cannot possibly appear in
blighted, depressed inner city schools where many teachers and
principals simply have abandoned the mission to educate, and
where peer stimulation is at a minimum given the common depressed experiences. An examination of Milliken leaves one to
ponder whether the Burger majority even sensed they were deciding the fate of numerous pupils who actually live: pupils who
laugh, run, cry, study, explore, think, dream, and plan for the
future.
Chief Justice Burger commenced his opinion, appropriately
enough, with Brown v. Board of Education. His interpretation of
Brown, however, is indicative of the majority's assessment of the
total problem surrounding school segregation. "The target of the
Brown holding was clear and forthright," wrote the Chief Justice
for a five-man majority: "the elimination of state mandated or
deliberately maintained dual school systems with certain schools
for Negro pupils and others for white pupils.""13 There was not
even a nod to Brown's emphasis on the deeply pernicious effects
of school segregation on minority children;131 nor, as the opinion
developed, was there any cogent analysis of the extent to which
the Detroit system had emposed segregation in the schools.
From his narrow perspective of Brown, Chief Justice Burger
127. U.S. -,
94 S.Ct. 2006 (1974).
128. U.S. -,
94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974).
129. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
130. U.S.....
94 S.Ct. 3112, 3123 (1974).

131. See e.g., Bell, School Litigation Strategies for the 1970's: New Phases in the
Continuing Quest For Quality Schools, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 257; Clark, Fifteen Years of
DeliberateSpeed, SATURDAY REv. (Dec. 20, 1969).
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then asserted that the corrective powers of the courts may only
be invoked when a constitutional violation has been demonstrated, and any remedy fashioned must be tailored to that specific violation:' 32
A federal remedial power may be exercised 'only on the
basis of a constitutional violation' and, '[a]s with any equity
case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the
remedy.'
Eventually the majority opinion insisted that, since the evil existed in Detroit, any remedy must be applicable only to the Detroit situation. As Chief Justice Burger put it in rejecting the
consolidation of school districts plan, the "scope of the remedy is
determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation;" 33 and "without an inter-district violation and inter-district
effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an inter-district
remedy."' 34
Great emphasis was placed on the principle of local control
-the need for local school districts to exercise autonomy over
the operation of their schools.'35 That principle of local autonomy,
the majority felt, would be violated through consolidation. Moreover, consolidation would produce too many problems such as
"large-scale transportation of students," and operational and
financial headaches. 3 Furthermore, the Michigan District Court
somehow would emerge first as a "de facto 'legislative authority'" and ultimately become "school superintendent" for all the
districts in question. 3 ' Thus did the majority sound the death
knell of consolidation and propel the country into attendance at
the "wake" for Brown v. Board of Education. Justice Stewart's
concurring assertion that, "[ifn reversing the decision of the
Court of Appeals this Court is in no way turning its back on the
proscription of state-imposed segregation first voiced in Brown v.
Board of Education"'38 is simply unconvincing.
It remained for dissenting Justices Douglas, White, Brennan,
and Marshall to give Milliken the life and perspective it commands, with all its ramifications for the future nature of AmeriU.S.
94 S.Ct. 3112, 3124 (1974).
132. , 94 S.Ct. at 3127.
133. Id. at

134. Id.
135. Id. at
136. Id. at
137. Id. at
138. Id. at

94 S.Ct. at 3125-26.

,

94 S.Ct. at 3126.
94 S.Ct. at 3126-27.
, 94 S.Ct. at 3133 (Stewart, J., concurring).
,
,
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can society and the ideals and principles which supposedly govern it. Justice Douglas remarked bluntly: 39'
[w]hen we rule against the metropolitan remedy we take
a step that will likely put the problems of Blacks and our society
back to the period that antedated the separate but equal regime
of Plessy v. Ferguson...
He then carefully spells out the demoralizing and devastating
impact which Rodriguez and Milliken, combined, have on poor
inner city youth:"'
[t]he inner core of Detroit is now rather solidly black; and
the blacks, we know, in many instances are likely to be poorer,
just as were the Chicanos in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez. .

.

. By that decision the poorer school

districts must pay their own way. It is therefore a foregone conclusion that we have now given the States a formula whereby
the poor must pay their own way.
Today's decision given Rodriguez means that there is no
violation of the Equal Protection Clause though the schools are
segregated by race and though the Black schools are not only
'separate' but 'inferior.'
So far as equal protection is concerned we are now in a
dramatic retreat from the 8-1 decision in 1896 that Blacks could
be segregated in public facilities provided they received equal
treatment.
Justice White, another dissenter, touched on the majority's
"license" to states to ignore questions of school segregation, even
where deliberate acts produced the segregation:"'
[t]he core of my disagreement is that deliberate acts of
segregation and their consequences will go unremedied, not because a remedy would be infeasible or unreasonable in terms of
the usual criteria governing school desegregation cases, but because an effective remedy would cause what the Court considers
to be undue administrative inconvenience to the State. The
result is that the State of Michigan, the entity at which the
Fourteenth Amendment is directed, has successfully insulated
itself from its duty to provide effective desegregation remedies
by vesting sufficient power over its public schools in its local
139. Id. at

140. Id. at

_

94 S.Ct. at 3134 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

_

94 S.Ct. at 3134-35 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Note,

ConsolidationForDesegregation:The Unresolved Issue of the InevitableSequel, 82 YALE

L. J. 1691 (1973).
141. U.S. at _,

94 S.Ct. at 3136 (White, J., dissenting).
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school districts. If this is the case in Michigan, it will be the case
in most states.

Although the majority found it impossible to sanction consol-

idation under the fourteenth amendment, Justice White easily
fashioned a fourteenth amendment analysis ruling constitutional
the inter-district remedy deemed so necessary (by the Michigan
Courts and others) to the eradication of pernicious school segregation:142
[t]he State denies equal protection of the laws when its
public agencies, acting in its behalf, invidiously discriminate.
The State's default is 'the condition that offends the Constitution,'

. . .

and State officials may therefore be ordered to take

the necessary measures to completely eliminate from the Detroit
public schools 'all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.' ..... I

cannot understand, nor does the majority satisfactorily explain,
why a federal court may not order an appropriate inter-district
remedy, if this is necessary or more effective to accomplish this
constitutionally mandated task. As the Court unanimously observed in Swann: 'Once a right and a violation have been shown,
the scope of a district court's equitable power to remedy past
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.'

. .

. In this case, both the right and the State's

Fourteenth Amendment violation have concededly been fully
established, and there is no acceptable reason for permitting the
party responsible for the constitutional violation to contain the
remedial powers of the federal court within administrative
boundaries over which the transgressor itself has plenary power.
Finally, Justice Marshall, whose interest in school desegregation is long-standing, registered a stinging, emotional but nonetheless reasoned dissent. He characterized the majority opinion
as "a giant step backwards" and an "emasculation of our constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.""'4 After
Milliken, he felt, Detroit's Black pupils (and others in various
cities across the country) will be exposed to "the same separate
and inherently unequal education in the future as they have been
unconstitutionally afforded in that past.""' The majority's mandate that Detroit proceed to desegregate its schools represents a
total farce. How are Blacks to racially integrate with Blacks in a
5
predominantly Black school district?1
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

_
_
,
,

94 S.Ct.
94 S.Ct.
94 S.Ct.
94 S.Ct.

at
at
at
at

3140-41 (White, J., dissenting).
3145-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3145.
3155.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol3/iss1/1

26

Reid: Equal Protection or Equal Denial: Is It Time for Racial Minoritie

Equal Protection or Denial
Justice Marshall also pierced the majority's emphasis on the
principle of local control. In pointing out that that principle is
mythical in Detroit, Justice Marshall observed: "
[w]hatever may be the history of public education in other
parts of our Nation, it simply flies in the face of reality to say,
as does the majority, that in Michigan, 'No single tradition in
public education is more deeply rooted than local control over
the operation of schools. . .

.'

As the State's supreme court has

said: 'We have repeatedly held that education in this State is
not a matter of local concern, but belongs to the state at large.'
his lengthy dissent on a plea, an accusaJustice Marshall ended
14 7
tion, and a prediction:

Desegregation is not and was never expected to be an easy
task. Racial attitudes ingrained in our Nation's childhood and
adolescence are not quickly thrown aside in its middle years.
But just as the inconvenience of some cannot be allowed to
stand in the way of the rights of others, so public opposition, no
matter how strident, cannot be permitted to divert this Court
from the enforcement of the constitutional principles at issue in
this case. Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection of a perceived public mood that we have gone far enough in enforcing
the Constitution's guarantee of equal justice than it is the product of neutral principles of law. In the short run, it may seem
to be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas to
be divided up each into two cities-one white, the other blackbut it is a course, I predict, our people will ultimately regret.
The widely publicized DeFunis v. Odegaard' decision represented a clear threat to the interests of those bent on making
certain that Blacks and other racial minorities gained access to
valuable educational opportunities. The threat was double-edged
-if the Court rendered a decision on the merits, that decision
in all probability would reject the constitutional permissibility of
minority admissions programs.4 On the other hand, if the Court
"released" DeFunis on procedural grounds of mootness, as it
94 S.Ct. at 3152.
146. Id. at
94 S.Ct. at 3161.
147. Id. at
, 94 S.Ct. 1704 (1974).
U.S. 148. -

149. If the Court's opinions in San Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez
and Milliken v. Bradley are indicative of a trend toward decisions contrary to the interests
of Blacks and other minorities in education, DeFunis, too, would have been resolved in
favor of DeFunis, not the minorities covered by the University of Washington minority
admission program.
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did, 5' educational institutions left hanging in terms of the constitutional validity of minority admissions programs and procedures
no doubt would exercise caution and proceed to dismantel such
programs and procedures. 5
One cannot be labeled hysterical or engaged in distortions for
concluding that after Rodriguez, Milliken, and DeFunis, education for minorities is in shambles. The inner-city racial minority
now know that education is not a fundamental interest, that inequitable educational financing schemes may be sanctioned even
where the monetary expenditures for the affluent and the white
pupil far exceed those for the poor and minority in the same
school districts; and that universities and other educational institutions, trying to close the gap between whites and minorities in
terms of the educational experience, may be slapped in the face
on allegedly constitutional grounds. Finally, the inner-city youth
and his advocates, may be left with the empty, ulcer-like feeling
that after all the soul-searching and risk-generated behavior connected to Plessy v. Ferguson'sprogeny in the graduate and professional school field, and Brown v. Board of Education, racially
segregated and unequal educational facilities now are deemed
perfectly acceptable.
As if the educational trilogy of Rodriguez, Milliken, and
DeFuniswere not enough, racial minorities, supposedly protected
by suspect classification status, must ponder other Supreme
Court decisions which have reduced Blacks, other minorities and
the poor to an even greater inferior status. Take, for example,

5 2, involving
James v. Valtierra'
the construction of a low-rent

housing project, customarily reserved for the poor-especially the
minority poor. In that case, the Supreme Court refused to recognize the presence of any racial considerations. Justice Black, writing for the Valtierra majority, bluntly stated: "[t]he record...
[did not] support any claim that a law seemingly neutral (with
150. Only Justice Douglas attempted to make some coherent comment on the merits
of DeFunis. Justices Brennan, White and Marshall, joined by Justice Douglas dissented
on the principle that, "[m]ere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not
moot a case." U.S. _, _,
94 S.Ct. 1704, 1721 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
151. Although there has not been time to make a statistical determination or a
qualitative inquiry, the author's impression is that the DeFunis furor has led some universities to abandon minority admissions programs, and others to proceed with the kind
of caution that is bound to reduce the number of minority students accepted for admission. Add this probable abandonment and caution to an economy burdened by inflation
and hence stingy with educational grants, and the prognosis for the Black and minority
student becomes gloomy and cast in terms of terminal illness.

152. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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respect to race) on its face is in fact aimed at a racial minority.' 15 3
Consider Dandridge v. Williams,'54 where the Court also ignored
racial considerations. Ponder Palmer v. Thompson'5' where the
Court also saw no racial implications in the fact that the City of
Jackson had closed all its public swimming pools.' 6 Finally, re57
flect on Mayor of Philadelphiav. EducationalEquity League,'
where Blacks in Philadelphia had questioned procedures for selecting school board members of the Black race, even though the
Black student population of Philadelphia stood at 60% and the
total Black population at 34%.'11 Justice Powell chose to ignore
the thrust of this argument and stressed, instead, the reluctance
of the Court to intervene in discretionary choices of state public
officials without proof of racial discrimination, as well as its inability to bind the successor of a mayor involved in the original
litigation'5' without supplemental findings of fact.'60
On its face, Mayor of Philadelphiaappears to be a weak case
in light of questions as to whether the mayor in fact said publicly
that he would not appoint any more Blacks to the school board,
and given the change in administrations.' Yet the case presents
the kind of subtle, slippery discrimination that is hard to pinpoint, thus seemingly necessitating an even more serious judicial
scrutiny. Moreover, it squarely presents the issue of the right of
153. Id. at 141. For a view that James u. Valtierra did not necessarily cut off equal
protection grounds as a means of eliminating discrimination in housing see Note, The
Equal Protection Clause and ExclusionaryZoning After Valtierraand Dandridge,81 YALE
L. J. 61, 73-74 (1971).
154. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See notes 82 et seq. supra, and accompanying text for
discussion.
155. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
156. But see Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974), which concerned
efforts by Blacks to gain access to public parks and recreational facilities, which first
started in 1958. The Supreme Court ruled that the use - especially exclusive use - of
these public facilities by private segregated entities contravened the fourteenth amendment through a denial of equal protection.
157. 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
158. Under the Philadelphia procedure, the Mayor appoints a 13 member Educational Nominating Panel which in turn recommends persons for the school board. Nine
members, by law, of generally specified "city-wide organizations or institutions;" the
other four are designated by the Mayor. The procedure had produced 11 whites and 2
Blacks in 1967, 12 whites and 1 Black in 1969, and 11 whites and 2 Blacks in 1971
(originally the break-down for 1971 was 12 whites and 1 Black until a black person assumed the helm of one of the city organizations tapped for automatic membership on the
panel.
159. Mayor Tate was succeeded by Mayor Rizzo in 1972 while the present litigation
was still pending.
160. 415 U.S. 605 (1974) and footnotes 15, 17, 18, 19 of the majority opinion.
161. 415 U.S. at 623.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1975

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 1

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 3, 1975]

racial minorities to participate in decision-making institutions at
the policy level, especially in public institutions where the constituency is predominantly minority. In other words, it raises the
sticky and perplexing issue of how to circumvent the discretionary powers of public officials who may ignore a minority need or
interest in order to cater to other constituency demands. Dissenters White, Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas no doubt appreciated the subtle discrimination involved when they deferred to
the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the Constitution had been
violated on racial grounds.
Glimpses into all of the above-mentioned decisions leave a
stark question: will Blacks continue to be regarded as a discrete
and insular minority - in practice? Recent Supreme Court cases
raise serious doubts about Blacks in fact (as opposed to in theory)
continuing as a recognized suspect classification.
As a result of our peek into the Court's treatment of suspect
classification for women, the poor, and racial minorities, it is
tempting to give up hope and to admit that the present Court
intends no gains for the oppressed.1 12 Some would argue that the
admission is premature, and the analysis incomplete, for strict
judicial scrutiny also is invoked where fundamental personal
rights and interests are at stake. We move next, therefore to an
analysis of whether that approach is more fruitful in terms of the
objectives of the poor, racial minorities, women, and other oppressed people.
THE FUNDAMENTAL PERSONAL RIGHTS AND INTERESTS

Box

Does the fundamental personal rights and interests approach
generate greater hope for the oppressed in their quest for justice?
If so, can minorities, the poor, women, and other oppressed persons agree on a common listing which ought to be pressed before
the Courts?
Champions of the fundamental interests approach are beginning to emerge. One commentator believes that approach less
arbitrary and hence, superior to the suspect classification doctrine.' 3 Another terms it perhaps "the most sensible way to provide every citizen with a minimum level of those things essential
162. This is the thrust of this author's earlier writings. See Reid, The Burger Court
and the Civil Rights Movement: The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court
Taketh Away, 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L. J. 410 (1972); Reid, CastAside By the Burger Court:
Blacks in Quest of Justice and Education, 49 NoTRE DAME LAwYEa 105 (1973).
163. See Note, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal
Protection,40 U. CHI. L. REv. 807 (1973).
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to upward social and economic mobility." '6 4 Still another imagines it the soundest path to more just and ethical decisions. 65'
A glimpse at the shopping list of fundamental rights reveals
that the Court has embraced procreation,'66 marriage and divorce,'67 voting,'68 travel,'69 certain criminal procedural guarantees, 70 and some aspects of privacy.17 ' It has yet to envelope housing, welfare payments, the elimination of a debt burden, and
starting a new life. In fact, though housing may be looked upon
as "a matter of special judicial concern,' ' 72 the Court's resolution
of James v. Valtierra73 leaves a huge question mark regarding
housing's ascendancy to the fundamental interest category. Welfare payments,' elimination of debt burden and starting a new
life: 71 all have been found wanting when compared with marital
interests, and hence not proper or sufficiently significant for
treatment as fundamental interests. Education has been soundly
and categorically rejected as a fundamental interest.' 7 Employment, too, has yet to be designated as a fundamental interest.
Outside of the domestic relations-privacy arena in which women
have expressed great interest, the panoply of fundamental rights
is far from fortified.
Perhaps the poor, minorities, women, and other oppressed
people would acquire a more powerful voice in the determination
of which rights are to be deemed fundamental if they could agree
on the kinds of rights which should be pushed before the Court
during the next five years. Do marriage, divorce and procreation
occupy the same level of significance in a battery of human rights
as the right to decent housing, employment, education, and penal
164. Note, The Equal Protection Clauseand Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierraand
Dandridge,81 YALE L. J. 61, 71 (1971).
165. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protectingthe
Poor Through the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARv.L. REv. 7 (1969) and Michelman, The
Advent of a Right to Housing:A CurrentAppraisal, 5 HARv. Cw. IGHTS-Civ. Lin. L. REV.
207 (1970).
166. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
167. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
168. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964).
169. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
170. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
171. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
172. See Note, The Equal ProtectionClause and Exclusionary ZoningAfter Valtierra
and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61, 70 n. 36 (1971).
173. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
174. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
175. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973).
176. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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justice? Can the same objectives of the feminist movement be
achieved by leaving changes in marital status to political and
legislative pressures and actions, while concentrating instead on
issues of employment, education, housing, and penal justice in
the judicial arena?
Even if the poor, racial minorities, and women could agree
on fundamental interests which should be pushed before the
courts, there is a limitation to the fundamental personal rights
and interests approach. The greatest drawback to reliance on the
fundamental interests approach is the tendency of the Supreme
Court to bow to state legislatures on economic and social concerns. That is, the Court distinguishes between the personal interests, which it feels equipped to protect first and foremost in the
judicial arena, and economic concerns which it considers better
earmarked for the province of states since they are viewed as more
capable of understanding local conditions. Thus, the judiciary
may represent a protective force for personal interests like marriage and procreation while the state is left to assert its wisdom
relative to social and economic interests such as the right to earn
a living. For example, by reading "welfare payments" and "elimination of a debt burden" or "obtaining a new start in life" as
social and economic concerns, the Court in Ortwein and Kras
rejected the request of plaintiffs in those cases to place those
items into the fundamental rights and interests box.
Thus, sole reliance on the fundamental interests approach
will not enable one to reach the roots of the povertydiscrimination syndrome as long as the Supreme Court insists
that certain social and economic concerns are not eligible for the
fundamental interests box. This realization takes us into our final
area in inquiry.
THE

SLIDING SCALE APPROACH:

A

REMEDY FOR THE SUSPECT

CLASSIFICATION AND FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS LIMITATIONS?

If the suspect classification and fundamental interests approaches individually cannot have solid impact on discrimination
against the poor, racial minorities, women, and other oppressed
peoples, is there another approach which might be more potent?
Professor Cox has called attention to the interaction between
the suspect class idea and the fundamental interests or subject
matter involved in particular litigation. He suggests that we
might examine "the relative invidiousness of the particular differentiation" and "the relative importance of the subject with
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respect to which equality is sought.

'.177

This process necessitates

the assignment of weights, or at least the adoption of some system
of evaluation under which the degree of judicial scrutiny becomes
dependent on the value of the interests rising to the "suspect" or
"fundamental" level.
The interaction of the factors about which Professor Cox
speaks'
can be visualized by imagining two gradients. Along the first of
these gradients is a hierarchy of classifications, with those which
are most invidious-suspect classifications based on traits such
as race at the top. Along the second, arranged in ascending order
of importance, are interests such as employment, education,
and voting. When the classification drawn lies at the top of the
first gradient, it will be subject to strict review when the interest
if affects ranks low on the second gradient-for example, the
denial of a driver's license on the basis of race. As the nature of
the classification becomes less invidious (descending on the first
gradient) the measure will continue to elicit strict review only
as it affects interests progressively more important (ascending
on the second gradient). Thus, restrained review might be applied when a State disqualifies indigents by requiring a fee from
all person's desiring a driver's license or a university education,
whereas strict review is applied when indigents are disqualified
from voting through a fee imposed on the exercise of that right.
This is the "sliding scale" model.
The "sliding scale" model does seem to have some virtue
provided agreement can be reached on the ordering of suspect
classifications and personal interests. The following (necessarily
incomplete) schedule is suggested:
Fundamental InterestI80
Suspect Classification1 79
Wealth
Race
Sex

Employment
Education
Housing
Voting
Marriage
Procreation

177. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: ConstitutionalAdjudication
and the Promotionof Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. Rzv. 91, 95 (1966).
178. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,82 HAav. L. REv. 1065, 112021 (1969).
179. Added to the list after sex might be imprisonment, as well as some other designa-
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The greatest weight ought to be given to wealth as a suspect
classification. This is true despite the fact that wealth is sometimes a transitory state for some-that is, one may be poor today
and comfortable tomorrow. There is, however, a sufficient degree
of generational poverty to counteract the transitory nature of poverty cases. Furthermore, the wealth classification would enable
society to tackle serious discrimination against both racial minorities and women, without overlooking the grass roots poor. The
danger of assigning top weight either to racial minorities or
women is that middle class racial minorities and women may
tend to receive the conferred judicial benefits to the exclusion of
the poorer racial minorities and females.
The second greatest weight should be assigned to race as a
suspect classification. Although, as was suggested earlier, there
are dangers in comparing degree of discrimination against women
with that against racial minorities-especially Blacks, this author feels confident in asserting that the evil remains more pernicious on the side of race than gender. The supposed economic and
educational gains of Blacks, believed to be evident in the late
sixties and early seventies, may be mythical while women actually may have achieved appreciable real gains.'
Ordering fundamental interests is not an easy task because
virtually all of those interests considered important in our society
are essential to wipe out a syndrome of discrimination against the
poor, racial minorities, and women. It is posited, however, that
employment is most fundamental and voting less fundamental.
While voting once was viewed as a potential salvation for racial
minorities, it is becoming increasingly clear that political power
tions. The author suggests imprisonment since prisoners historically have struggled to
retain basic procedural safeguards as well as fundamental civil liberties.
180. Other interests could be added, such as rights of prisoners, which would be
placed after housing.
181. As a sampling of the differential see U.S. Dep't of Labor study by Recruiting
Management Consultants, Inc. released in September, 1973, in N.Y. Times, September
11, 1973, at 21, col. 1 (city ed.); Ford Foundation-sponsored report, Minority Enrollment
and Representation in Institutionsof Higher Education, in N.Y. Times, August 26, 1974,
at 32, col. 1 (city ed.); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE
BLACK POPULATION N THE UNITED STATES (1972). See also 172 N.Y.L.J. 40, August 26, 1974,
at 1, col. 3 for comment on the increase in the number of female law clerks serving the
the federal judicial system, and 171 N.Y.L.J. 10, January 15, 1974, at 1, col. 3 demonstrating that the percentage of females enrolled in law schools increased steadily and significantly from 1963 to 1973 (to 16% of total enrollment) while that for Blacks grew slowly
(to only 8.9%).
See generally issues of Women Today and Spokeswoman.
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Equal Protection or Denial
in urban centers, wracked by years of stifled growth and vicious
incaploss or reduction of social services, may prove empty power
1 82
minority,
racial
or
poor
economic
any
able of helping
Education is listed as second in weight on the fundamental
interest gradient, despite Rodriguez, because many of the poor,
racial minorities, and female gender still consider education as an
avenue of escape from odious discrimination. Certainly without
a masters degree, bachelors degree, or high school diploma there
is little hope that racial minorities, the poor, and females can
advance even minimally in this society. Thus the error of
Rodriguez urgently awaits correction. Housing is listed third on
the supposition that decent employment and education can lead
to decent housing whereas decent housing may not necessarily
lead to employment and educational opportunities.
Under the "sliding scale" approach, then, cases involving
wealth classifications and interests like employment and education would be subjected to the strictest judicial scrutiny whereas
cases involving sex and marriage would receive the least degree
of scrutiny.
For many women our suggested adoption of the "sliding
scale" approach might appear unappetizing since it would detract from the domestic relations type decision with which that
gender seems to have had its greatest success. Yet, if women
could be made to see that marital type issues such as pregnancy
leaves have virtually no impact on erasing fundamental discrimination against the poor, racial minorities, and women, then perhaps their litigation strategies could be altered for the sake of the
183
common good.
If we start with the realization that law in and of itself is a
conservative tool, and that the gains to be extracted from the
judicial system amount to no more than "crumbs," those
"crumbs" may become more delectable and filling with a con182. The economic problems faced by Mayor Kenneth Gibson of Newark, and Mayor
Richard Hatcher of Gary are indicative of the trend of Blacks ascending to political power
only to discover that few local, state, or federal resources are under their control. This
recognition of empty urban political power is not meant to deny the fact that certain
segments of the society still must be protected in their efforts to exercise the vote. This is
particularly true for the ex-felon who often also is burdened by racial discrimination in
addition to that imposed by his previous condition of imprisonment. The Supreme Court
- U.S. _, 94 S.Ct. 2655 (1974) recently found no equal
in Richardson v. Ramirez,
protection violation in a California statute which refused voting rights to felons who have
completed their court-imposed sentences and their paroles. See also Note, The Need for
Reform of Ex-Felon DisenfranchisementLaws, 83 YArE. L. J. 580 (1974).
183. The case might be different if educational and other institutions forbade work
once inception occurred and required a mandatory year of absence after birth before
allowing women to return to employment.
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certed approach concentrating on wealth and race and fundamental interests like employment, education, and housing. This
orientation at least would center the attack on alleviating gross
conditions affecting the social status of poor women and poor
men, as well as racial minorities of both sexes. The more affluent
of the female and male sex would still have the administrative
and political arena option open to tackle the kinds of discrimination deemed appalling. The more affluent can afford an intensive
and sustained lobbying effort; the poor and Black as yet have not
been able to raise the sums necessary for a significant lobbying
endeavor. The more affluent may use the tool of intimidation to
worm their way out of potentially discriminating experiences but
few are intimidated now by the poor and racial minorities.
If we are to balance the inequities, then, this scale would
come down heavily on the side of the poor first, then the racial
minority, then the female sex. This balance in turn would launch
us on a course destined to latch securely, in behalf of the poor and
racial minorities, those fundamental interests of employment,
education, and housing. If these inequities are not balanced and
subjected to some weighting system, then we can predict that the
poor, minorities, and females will continue thrashing around in
an uncontrolled sea of litigation with no visible island bearing the
fruit of hope, survival, and extrication from the strong arm of
societal injustice.
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